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Abstract. The merits of machine learning in information security have 
primarily focused on bolstering defenses. However, machine learning (ML) 
techniques are not reserved for organizations with deep pockets and mas- 
sive data repositories; the democratization of ML has lead to a rise in 
the number of security teams using ML to support offensive operations. 
The research presented here will explore two models that our team has 
used to solve a single offensive task, detecting a sandbox. Using pro- 
cess list data gathered with phishing emails, we will demonstrate the use 
of Decision Trees and Artificial Neural Networks to successfully classify 
sandboxes, thereby avoiding unsafe execution. This paper aims to give 
unique insight into how a real offensive team is using machine learning 
to support offensive operations. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The composite set of problems an offensive team needs to solve in order to gain 
and keep access to a network is quite complex, especially when there are one or 
more defensive products at each phase of an attack. At a very high level, the 
process [8] is as follows: 
 
 
1. External Reconnaissance – Gathering emails, footprinting external in- 
frastructure. 
 
2. Initial Access – Exploiting a technical vulnerability, or landing a phish. 
 
3. Foothold Stabilization – Installing persistence and ensuring access to the 
network is safe and stable. 
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4. Privilege Escalation – Gaining elevated privileges in the network. 
 
5. Action on Objectives – Pivoting to relevant servers/hosts, exfiltrating 
data, installing additional malware, etc. 
 
Given the gauntlet of products and configurations each network presents, it is 
important that offensive teams take steps to reduce exposure of their Intellectual 
Property (aka Tools, Tactics, and Procedures) at all phases of an attack. The 
cost of not doing so can be high – ask any team that has needed to re-roll their 
entire infrastructure, lost a useful technique to carelessness, or had to rewrite a 
piece of malware. 
One important way to protect offensive IP is by  preventing the detection  
of phishing payloads. Phishing is a common technique to gain initial access to 
organizations’ networks. A typical phishing email will emulate correspondence 
from a trusted entity, with the aim of convincing the user to access a malicious 
web link or attachment. When clicked, the link or attachment will download a 
payload onto the user’s system, ready for the user to execute. After execution, 
malware is deployed, giving access to the user’s host and potentially compromis- 
ing the security of an entire network. This is particularly dangerous when the 
user works for a large corporation or government entity that safeguards critical 
information. 
To combat the rise in phishing emails that contain malicious documents, secu- 
rity vendors have integrated sandbox environments into their products. Because 
sandboxes provide a controlled environment for security analysts to observe mal- 
ware, it is in the best interest of attackers to keep their malware from executing 
in a sandbox. To evade analysis, malicious payloads often contain checks against 
the properties of the host that would indicate whether or not the payload is 
being executed in a sandbox. If a host fails a check, the payload simply exits, 
or executes benign code. In this way, a payload might evade scrutiny from more 
skilled human analysts. Sandboxes also provide a pipeline of threat intelligence 
data. This data further helps defenders by providing clues about new trends in 
phishing techniques and malware authorship. 
In this paper we present a novel sandbox detection method based on process 
list data. We compare the performance of two ML algorithms on this task: A 
Decision Tree classifier based on [3] and [2] and a two-layer Artificial Neural 
Network (ANN) implemented in Keras [5]. Empirical results show that both 
models perform well, and are both accurate enough to trust with automated 
malware deployment decisions. We conclude by highlighting several operational 
considerations that govern potential deployment of this technology in production 
settings, including Attribution, Sandbox drift, and Adversarial inputs. 
 
1.1 Basic Sandbox Evasion 
Successful execution of a payload on target largely depends on successful sandbox 
evasion. This can be accomplished via inline evasion techniques such as extended 
sleep times; logic that executes when specific conditions are met; or calls to 
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trusted domains for special key-exchanges. However, many of these behaviors 
are well known and can be detected by sufficiently advanced sandboxes [1] [11]. 
Further, some sandbox checks are used so frequently in the context of malware, 
that the checks themselves become classified as malicious. 
Common sandbox detection techniques include checking for recently used 
files, virtualization MAC addresses, the presence of a keyboard, domain mem- 
bership, and so forth. However, in the escalating arms race of cybersecurity, 
security vendors clamp down on detectable information almost as quickly as 
malware developers begin to exploit it [4]. Moreover, as information for attack- 
ers grows harder to come by, the best checks are checks that provide additional 
information about a host, or the environment. 
When attempting to gain initial access via phishing, one of the first pieces 
of information our team gathers from a host is a process list3. We manually 
review each process list in order to gather the security products installed on the 
host, the architecture, domain-joined status, and user context. The information 
is used to determine if it is safe to proceed with the next phase of the attack - 
installing persistence and deploying other tools. Additionally, a process list can 
be helpful when troubleshooting deployment failures: By knowing more about 
the execution environment, we can more confidently adjust our technique or 
payload for the next execution opportunity. 
 
2 Related Work 
 
To our knowledge, no previous research has explored the application of machine 
learning to sandbox detection via process list data. As it turns out, applications 
of ML to any form of offensive strategy are difficult to come by, primarily due 
to data scarcity within the execution environment and the lack of ability for 
offensive teams to share rich datasets. Accordingly, ML for penetration testing 
generally focuses on exploring already open-source data such as discovering vul- 
nerabilities, for example by using a Naive Bayes classifier to identify the active 
web server [6] or by using a convolutional neural network to identify outdated 
(and hence likely vulnerable) web sites via visual inspection of screenshots [7]. 
ML has also been used for payload optimization by the penetration test tool 
DeepExploit [9], which examines system configurations and selects payloads via 
the asynchronous model A3C [10]. 
 
3 Methodology 
 
In this research, our goal was to accurately classify sandboxes using the afore- 
mentioned process list data. A key advantage of this approach is its ability to 
generalize and automate sandbox checks, such that network operators aren’t re- 
sponsible for manually exiting malware that has been executed in a sandbox. 
Additionally, rather than gathering information from multiple sources on the 
3 tasklist.exe/ps 
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host, thereby increasing activity on the target, simply collecting a process list is 
sufficient to gather the model’s input data. How the information is gathered is 
not part of this paper, but common execution vectors include command execu- 
tion, Win32 API calls, or shellcode injection. Each process list was posted to an 
external server for collection and processing. There were no sandbox detection 
checks used during data collection. Each process list was manually labelled as 
target (0), or sandbox (1). 
 
3.1 Process List Data 
A process list is a valuable piece of information. Not only is it a reflection of the 
security posture of the host, it is a reflection of the user, and a standard corporate 
image. Experience of the authors suggests that differences between “safe” (Ap- 
pendix: Table 5) and “unsafe” (Appendix: Table 6) hosts are consistent across 
multiple organizations and sandboxes from multiple vendors, such that process 
list data could be generalized sufficiently to make an accurate classification. 
Since both experience and empirical evidence (Appendix: Table 5, Table 6) 
suggest that process count and user context are major contributors to successful 
human classification4, the following features were selected: 
– Process Count 
– User Count 
– Process Count/User Count Ratio 
 
Process Count - End user workstations typically have a lot of processes out- 
side of the default Windows processes running: Multiple office products, security 
products, etc. Sandboxes just boot up, run the payload, and close. Sandboxes 
aren’t using Excel, Word, Spotify, etc. all at the same time. Additionally, most 
end user workstations are Windows 10, while most sandboxes still run Windows 
7. It’s an important note, because the number of default processes on Windows 
10 is significantly higher. 
User Count – User count is a proxy for administrative privileges. On Win- 
dows, if the user is running in a medium-integrity context, the process list will 
only contain ownership information for processes the user owns (or has access to 
read). Otherwise, if the user is running in a high-integrity context, the process 
list will contain the owners for all processes. The difference in user count can 
be attributed to the fact that most sandboxes run payloads in a high-integrity 
context, but most organizations have removed administrative rights from their 
users. 
Process/User Ratio - This feature is simply a combination of the previous 
features, and only seeks to support the inductive bias of the authors. Model 
accuracy was lower when this feature was omitted from training. Other features 
such as average process id, or a boolean indication of known safe processes 
running on the host would be alternative options not explored in our research. 
4 Even the casual observer will notice stark differences between each process list (Ap- 
pendix: Table 5, Table 6) 
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All Data (384 Samples) 
Feature Min Max Mean Std Dev 
Process Count 9.0 305.0 80.0 59.9 
User Count 1.0 17.0 2.5 1.7 
Ratio 2.1 305.0 50.3 64.6 
Safe (324 Samples) 
Process Count 9.0 305.0 89.2 60.7 
User Count 1.0 17.0 2.5 1.8 
Ratio 2.1 305.0 57.2 68.0 
Unsafe (60 Samples) 
Process Count 11.0 56.0 30.6 11.65 
User Count 1.0 4.0 2.9 1.0 
Ratio 2.7 44.0 12.9 8.8 
Table 1. Process list data collected via server uploads executed by phishing payloads. 
Environments were labeled “Safe” if a human analyst identified the process list as 
indicative of a production environment and “Unsafe” if the analyst classified it as a 
Sandbox environment. 
 
 
3.2 Data Analysis and Limitations 
An overview of the collected process lists and feature statistics is presented in Ta- 
ble 1. Of 384 collected process lists, 60 were judged to be sandbox environments 
and 324 were judged to be production environments. Process list length ranged 
from 9.0 - 305.0 active processes, with a mean length of 80.0 and a standard 
deviation of 59.9. 
A number of observations can be made about the data depicted in Table 1. 
Firstly, user count is not a robust way of checking whether the payload was run 
as an administrator. While most sandboxes run payloads as an administrator, 
some do not, and this reflects in the user count due to the variance in Windows 
permissions. 
Secondly, the max users in safe hosts is 17.0 (Table 1). It is unusual for a 
phishing target to have  17 users logged in, and is more indicative of a server  
of some sort, or would indicate a particular organization’s remote access imple- 
mentation. This data point could be confidently removed. 
Finally, the data set is small by machine learning standards, and could affect 
the model’s ability to generalize for successful classification. Additionally, the 
dataset was not cleaned or processed to remove oddities or potentially erroneous 
data points. 
 
4 Algorithms 
 
We applied two ML algorithms to our sandbox detection task: A Decision Tree 
Classifier and an Artificial Neural Network. We will see in Section 5 that both 
models performed well, but the Decision Tree performed best overall. These two 
algorithms were selected for their simplicity. It is of utmost importance that 
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ML models deployed in offensive tasks are able to operate without much human 
oversight, particularly when many offensive teams lack data scientists. 
 
4.1 Decision Trees 
Decision Trees [3] are a non-parametric supervised learning method that can be 
easily visualized and interpreted, as seen in Figure 1. They are able to handle 
both numerical and categorical data, and do not require data normalization or 
other data preparation techniques. Potential drawbacks of Decision Trees include 
their susceptibility to overfitting and their difficulty representing XOR, parity, 
or multiplexor problems. They are also prone to overfitting in some contexts. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Graphical depiction of a sandbox-detection Decision Tree Classifier generated 
using scikit-learn [12]. A Decision Tree learns to classify each input vector using if-then 
decision rules extracted from direct observations of the data. 
 
Of the machine learning algorithms considered by our team, Decision Trees 
are closest to current human-driven methods of detection through a series of 
true/false checks. We trained our Decision tree using the features depicted in 
Table 1. Training was completed with a 80/20 split. No alterations were made 
to the raw features, such that the features of the process lists found in Appendix 
Table 5 and 6 were: 
 
 
hosts = [(40, 4, 10),(220, 1, 220), ...] 
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We found the Decision Tree Classifier to be data efficient, quick to train, and 
effective at our sandbox detection task. Additionally, team members preferred 
the Decision Tree due to its implicit explainability. Further details can be found 
in Section 5 of this paper. 
 
4.2 Artificial Neural Network 
An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is a biologically-inspired method of detect- 
ing predictable relationships between input samples and their associated training 
labels [13] [14]. ANNs can be difficult to train, but are able to represent complex 
functions and generalize well to previously unseen input configurations. 
For sandbox detection, we used a 3 by 3 artificial neural network built with 
Keras using binary cross-entropy loss. Raw inputs were scaled with min-max, and 
a sigmoid activation function was used. The model was trained for 500 epochs, 
as depicted in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. ANN Mean Squared Error during training. Minimum loss was achieved within a 
few hundred learning cycles, not surprising given the relatively small size of the training 
data. 
 
One challenge faced by our ANN was the fact that our dataset was both 
small and relatively “dirty”. This is not unexpected given our use case, but it 
does create a challenge for a learning algorithm that usually requires thousands 
of training examples in order to generalize well. In an ideal scenario, we would 
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have liked to collect a larger dataset, but real-world constraints of extracting 
process list information from initial access payloads in production environments 
made this infeasible. 
 
 
5 Results 
 
Results from our experiments are shown in Tables 2 and 3. The ANN achieved 
a classification accuracy of 92.71%. The Decision Tree Classifier was able to 
improve accuracy by 2.09% over the ANN, obtaining an overall classification 
accuracy of 94.80%. 
 
 
ANN Results 
Mean Absolute Error 0.1188 
Mean Squared Error 0.0573 
Accuracy 92.71% 
Table 2. Sandbox detection accuracy for a two-layer network with clamped inputs and 
sigmoid activation function using binary cross-entropy loss. This model was able to 
generalize well to unseen data, identifying sandbox environments with high likelihood. 
 
 
 
 
Decision Tree Results 
True Positive 66 
False Positive 1 
False Negative 3 
True Negative 7 
Accuracy 94.80% 
Table 3. Sandbox detection accuracy for a Decision Tree Classifier trained on the 
process list data depicted in Table 1. This model was able to outperform the ANN 
by 2.09%, and was preferred by our team because its decisions were transparent to 
humans. 
 
 
 
Table 4 shows the calculated precision, recall, and F1-score for Safe and 
Unsafe execution environments respectively, along with macro and weighted av- 
erages accounting for the classification imbalance in the dataset. Examination of 
the data reveals that safe hosts had a high F1-score of 0.97, but the unsafe hosts 
had a lower than acceptable level of 0.78. This is likely due to the small sample 
size of unsafe hosts. From an operational security perspective, avoiding unsafe 
execution is far more important than achieving safe execution for the longevity 
of a piece of malware. 
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Metrics Precision Recall F1-score support 
Safe 0.96 0.99 0.97 67 
Unsafe 0.88 0.70 0.78 10 
Macro Average 0.92 0.84 0.87 77 
Weighted Average 0.95 0.95 0.95 77 
Table 4. Decision Tree Metrics. Precision is the ratio of true positives to total pre- 
dicted positives. Recall is the ratio of true positives to total actual positives. F1-score 
is defined as 2 ∗ precision∗recall . A “Safe” label indicates a non-sandbox production en- 
vironment in which malicious code can be safely deployed. An “Unsafe” label indicates 
a sandbox environment. Support indicates the number of samples contributing to the 
data calculations. 
 
 
6 Discussion and Future Work 
There are several operational factors that must be considered before deploying 
models to a production setting. 
1. Attribution - If machine-learning models were embedded into malicious doc- 
uments, these files would be easy to attribute to a particular group as this 
technique is not well known or widespread. 
2. Sandbox drift - Overnight, all sandboxes could change, making all models 
and data irrelevant. The difference in Windows 10 and Windows 7 from a 
process count standpoint is significant. Or worse, sandboxes could change 
slowly, leading to inconsistent predictions. 
3. Adversarial inputs - Depending on how payloads are subsequently staged, 
an analyst could submit false inputs to the dropper server, gaining access to 
payloads. 
4. NLP techniques - tokenizing a process list rather than using a regex could be 
a more robust way of parsing process lists, as malware deployment methods 
will change. Additionally, NLP techniques such as document classification 
become possible. 
5. Data Collection - A separate data collection effort would be ideal, such that 
production payloads would be separate from collection payloads. This would 
allow for data collection efforts to support offensive operations without inter- 
fering with production deployments. Additionally, once access to a network 
has been gained, any host in the network becomes a potential phishing target. 
Therefore, any user workstation process list gathered would be a legitimate 
data point even if it did not come from the initial access payload. 
 
7 Further Research 
Further research in this area should focus on the collection of a larger and more 
balanced dataset in order to improve classification accuracy. We would also like 
to explore methods for client-side classification. Because a trained model is com- 
prised of static weights, they could be embedded into phishing payloads. This 
strategy, among others, should be examined for soundness and practicality. 
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Machine learning for offensive operations has typically been confined to a 
priori vulnerability analysis such as detecting specific server software or identi- 
fying outdated web sites. Our research demonstrates that machine learning can 
also be useful in situ. Even with limited training data, ML is able to allow the 
detection of sandbox environments with high accuracy, thus improving the like- 
lihood that malicious payloads will remain hidden. Going forward, we hope to 
see more applications of machine learning for such purposes. 
 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
In this paper we have explored the use of machine learning for in situ offensive 
operations, and have shown that both a Decision Tree Classifier and an Artificial 
Neural Network are able to detect safe environments with high accuracy and with 
a strong F1-score, even given limited data. We have outlined several operational 
considerations that will affect the use of this technology in production settings, 
and have suggested promising avenues for future exploration. As part of this 
research, a tool called ‘Deep-Drop’ was developed as a machine-learning enabled 
dropper server. Deep-Drop contains all code and data mentioned in this paper.5  
References 
 
1. Hira Agrawal, J. Alberi, L. Bahler, J. Micallef, A. Virodov, M. Magenheimer, 
S. Snyder, V. Debroy, and E. Wong. Detecting hidden logic bombs in critical 
infrastructure software. 7th International Conference on Information Warfare and 
Security, ICIW 2012, pages 1–11, 01 2012. 
2. Leo Breiman. Random forests. Machine learning, 45(1):5–32, 2001. 
3. Leo Breiman, J. H. Friedman, R. A. Olshen, and C. J. Stone. Classification and 
Regression Trees. Statistics/Probability Series. Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
Belmont, California, U.S.A., 1984. 
4. Alexander Chailytko and Stanislav Skuratovich. Defeating sandbox evasion: how 
to increase the successful emulation rate in your virtual environment, 2017. 
5. Franc¸ois  Chollet  et  al.   Keras:  Deep  learning  for  humans.   https://github.com/ 
fchollet/keras, 2015. 
6. Alisa   Esage. Gyoithon: tool to  make  penetration  testing  with  
machine      learning. https://www.securitynewspaper.com/2018/06/ 
02/gyoithon-tool-make-penetration-testing-machine-learning/, 2018. 
7. Bishop Fox. Eyeballer. https://github.com/bishopfox/eyeballer, 2019. 
8. Eric M Hutchins, Michael J Cloppert, and Rohan M Amin. Intelligence-driven 
computer network defense informed by analysis of adversary campaigns and in- 
trusion kill chains. Leading Issues in Information Warfare & Security Research, 
1(1):80, 2011. 
9. isao takaesu. Deepexploit. https://github.com/13o-bbr-bbq/machine\ learning\ 
security/tree/master/DeepExploit, 2019. 
 
5 https://github.com/moohax/Deep-Drop 
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 11 
 
 
10. Volodymyr Mnih, Adria Puigdomenech Badia, Mehdi Mirza, Alex Graves, Timo- 
thy Lillicrap, Tim Harley, David Silver, and Koray Kavukcuoglu. Asynchronous 
methods for deep reinforcement learning. In International conference on machine 
learning, pages 1928–1937, 2016. 
11. Hassan Mourad. Sleeping your way out of the sandbox. https://www.sans.org/ 
reading-room/whitepapers/malicious/sleeping-sandbox-35797, 2015. 
12. F. Pedregosa, G. Varoquaux, A. Gramfort, V. Michel, B. Thirion, O. Grisel, 
M. Blondel, P. Prettenhofer, R. Weiss, V. Dubourg, J. Vanderplas, A. Passos, 
D. Cournapeau, M. Brucher, M. Perrot, and E. Duchesnay. Scikit-learn: Machine 
learning in Python. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 12:2825–2830, 2011. 
13. Kevin L Priddy and Paul E Keller. Artificial neural networks: an introduction, 
volume 68. SPIE press, 2005. 
14. Frank Rosenblatt. The perceptron: a probabilistic model for information storage  
and organization in the brain. Psychological review, 65(6):386, 1958. 
12 Will Pearce, Nick Landers, and Nancy Fulda 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Safe Process List 
PID PPID ARCH SESS NAME OWNER 
0 0   System Process  
4 0 System 
456 4 smss.exe 
596 536 csrss.exe 
784 536 wininit.exe 
792 776 csrss.exe 
864 784 services.exe 
872 784 lsass.exe 
1020 864 svchost.exe 
416 864 svchost.exe 
496 784 fontdrvhost.exe 
860 864 svchost.exe 
1032 864 svchost.exe 
1116 776 winlogon.exe 
1172 1116 fontdrvhost.exe 
1268 864 svchost.exe 
1316 864 svchost.exe 
1324 864 svchost.exe 
1332 864 svchost.exe 
1484 864 svchost.exe 
1496 864 svchost.exe 
1504 864 svchost.exe 
1588 864 svchost.exe 
1660 864 svchost.exe 
1712 864 svchost.exe 
1732 1116 dwm.exe 
1788 864 svchost.exe 
1900 864 svchost.exe 
1912 864 svchost.exe 
2032 864 svchost.exe 
1168 864 svchost.exe 
2072 864 nvvsvc.exe 
2080 864 nvscpapisvr.exe 
2180 864 svchost.exe 
2216 2072 nvxdsync.exe 
2296 864 svchost.exe 
2328 864 svchost.exe 
2336 864 svchost.exe 
2364 864 svchost.exe 
2384 864 svchost.exe 
2460 864 svchost.exe 
2512 864 svchost.exe 
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2540 864   svchost.exe  
2552 1268 WUDFHost.exe 
2580 1168 dasHost.exe 
2676 864 svchost.exe 
2684 864 svchost.exe 
2732 864 svchost.exe 
2940 864 svchost.exe 
3004 864 svchost.exe 
2472 864 svchost.exe 
3068 864 igfxCUIService.exe 
3092 864 svchost.exe 
3180 864 svchost.exe 
3192 864 svchost.exe 
3544 1268 WUDFHost.exe 
3656 864 svchost.exe 
3820 864 svchost.exe 
3876 864 RtkAudioService64.exe 
3888 864 SavService.exe 
4000 864 svchost.exe 
3908 864 SearchIndexer.exe 
4124 3876 RAVBg64.exe 
4148 864 svchost.exe 
4156 864 svchost.exe 
4164 864 PulseSecureService.exe 
4200 864 svchost.exe 
4308 864 svchost.exe 
4428 864 svchost.exe 
4532 864 svchost.exe 
4620 864 SCFManager.exe 
4636 864 spoolsv.exe 
4892 864 SACSRV.exe 
4952 864 SCFService.exe 
5160 864 mDNSResponder.exe 
5172 864 armsvc.exe 
5184 864 OfficeClickToRun.exe 
5196 864 svchost.exe 
5236 864 AppleMobileDeviceService.exe 
5260 864 svchost.exe 
5268 864 IntelCpHDCPSvc.exe 
5276 864 AdminService.exe 
5284 864 LogiRegistryService.exe 
5324 864 svchost.exe 
5340 864 esif uf.exe 
5352 864 svchost.exe 
5360 864 FoxitConnectedPDFService.exe 
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5400 864   ALsvc.exe  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
5412 864   svchost.exe 
5420 864   swc service.exe 
5448 864   ManagementAgentNT.exe 
5480 864   SecurityHealthService.exe 
5492 864   RouterNT.exe 
5600 864   SAVAdminService.exe 
5648 864   swi service.exe 
5692 864   SntpService.exe 
5708 864   svchost.exe 
5720 864   sqlwriter.exe 
5732 864   ssp.exe 
5760 864   swi filter.exe 
5776 864   TBear.Maintenance.exe 
5788 864   WavesSysSvc64.exe 
5796 864   TeamViewer Service.exe 
5804 864   svchost.exe 
5812 864   svchost.exe 
5832 864   svchost.exe 
5944 864   svchost.exe 
5952 864   svchost.exe 
6132 5760   swi fc.exe 
6432 4   Memory Compression 
6716 864   svchost.exe 
7152 864   IntelCpHeciSvc.exe 
7220 4164   PulseSecureService.exe 
8764 864   sdcservice.exe 
9076 864   svchost.exe 
5316 864   svchost.exe 
9084 864   csia.exe 
3636 864   svchost.exe 
3148 864   svchost.exe 
4688 5340 x64 1 esif assist 64.exe 
5728 2032 x64 1 sihost.exe 
8020 864 x64 1 svchost.exe 
7968 864 x64 1 svchost.exe 
6448 1660 x64 1 itype.exe 
7488 1660 x64 1 ipoint.exe 
1412 1660 x64 1 taskhostw.exe 
6212 864   svchost.exe 
3848 864   PresentationFontCache.exe 
1048 5884 x64 1 explorer.exe 
9236 3520 x64 1 igfxEM.exe 
9532 416 x64 1 ShellExperienceHost.exe 
9768 416 x64 1 RuntimeBroker.exe 
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10132 1900 x64 1 TabTip.exe  
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
10192 10132 x86 1 TabTip32.exe 
10244 864   svchost.exe 
11596 10396 x64 1 chrome.exe 
9996 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
10744 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
12316 416 x64 1 SystemSettingsBroker.exe 
12464 864   svchost.exe 
12624 416   WmiPrvSE.exe 
13176 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
13208 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
13224 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
13236 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
2776 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
780 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
1544 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
13332 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
15048 1048 x64 1 MSASCuiL.exe 
15224 1048 x64 1 RtkNGUI64.exe 
15332 1048 x64 1 RAVBg64.exe 
14540 1048 x64 1 WavesSvc64.exe 
800 1048 x64 1 SACMonitor.exe 
14648 1048 x64 1 LCore.exe 
13152 1048 x64 1 RtkUGui64.exe 
15444 1048 x64 1 iTunesHelper.exe 
16144 1048 x64 1 DellSystemDetect.exe 
9116 1048 x86 1 ONENOTEM.EXE 
15840 10652 x86 1 Pulse.exe 
16316 864   iPodService.exe 
16124 10652 x86 1 ALMon.exe 
15980 10652 x86 1 jusched.exe 
15928 1660 x64 1 RAVBg64.exe 
14760 416 x64 1 unsecapp.exe 
15412 864   svchost.exe 
13648 1048 x64 1 Slack.exe 
9932 13648 x64 1 Slack.exe 
13656 13648 x64 1 Slack.exe 
14700 1048 x86 1 OUTLOOK.EXE 
14416 13648 x64 1 Slack.exe 
14428 416 x64 1 iexplore.exe 
15308 14428 x86 1 iexplore.exe 
9404 864 x64 1 svchost.exe 
12400 416 x64 1 dllhost.exe 
11324 864   svchost.exe 
16096 864   svchost.exe 
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11140 416   dllhost.exe 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
 
CORP \¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP \¡REDACTED¿ 
 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
 
 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
CORP\¡REDACTED¿ 
2964 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
13392 1048 x86 1 HprSnap6.exe 
9844 13392 x64 1 TsHelper64.exe 
14880 864   svchost.exe 
2980 13648 x64 1 Slack.exe 
1152 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
8964 416 x64 1 CertEnrollCtrl.exe 
15488 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
16836 864   svchost.exe 
4616 1268   WUDFHost.exe 
9416 416 x64 1 InstallAgent.exe 
7336 416 x64 1 InstallAgentUserBroker.exe 
11724 864   svchost.exe 
17420 864   svchost.exe 
17364 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
15372 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
10752 864   svchost.exe 
5672 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
18392 416 x64 1 Microsoft.StickyNotes.exe 
476 416 x64 1 SkypeHost.exe 
11656 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
6672 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
13044 416 x86 1 OneDrive.exe 
9920 416 x64 1 SearchUI.exe 
12768 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
1968 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
10004 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
13716 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
17216 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
14400 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
12348 11596 x64 1 chrome.exe 
10496 1116   LogonUI.exe 
16428 416 x64 1 LockAppHost.exe 
1632 416 x64 1 LockApp.exe 
16156 416 x64 1 ApplicationFrameHost.exe 
16540 416 x64 1 SystemSettings.exe 
13948 416 x64 1 Calculator.exe 
11752 416 x64 1 Microsoft.Photos.exe 
16568 864   svchost.exe 
11200 3592   ¡REDACTED¿.exe 
5684 3820 x64 0 audiodg.exe 
16856 1660 x64 1 ¡REDACTED¿.exe 
6416 16856 x64 1 conhost.exe 
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Unsafe Process List 
PID PPID ARCH SESS NAME OWNER 
0 0   System Process  
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE 
NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK SERVICE 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
bea-chi-t-7pr01\John Doe 
NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE 
bea-chi-t-7pr01\John Doe 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
bea-chi-t-7pr01 \John Doe 
NT AUTHORITY \SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY \NETWORK SERVICE 
NT AUTHORITY \NETWORK SERVICE 
bea-chi-t-7pr01 \John Doe 
bea-chi-t-7pr01 \John Doe 
bea-chi-t-7pr01 \John Doe 
bea-chi-t-7pr01 \John Doe 
bea-chi-t-7pr01 \John Doe 
bea-chi-t-7pr01 \John Doe 
NT AUTHORITY \LOCAL SERVICE 
NT AUTHORITY \SYSTEM 
NT AUTHORITY \SYSTEM 
bea-chi-t-7pr01 \John Doe 
bea-chi-t-7pr01 \John Doe 
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM 
bea-chi-t-7pr01\John Doe 
NT AUTHORITY \NETWORK SERVICE 
4 0 x86 0 System 
244 4 x86 0 smss.exe 
352 304 x86 0 csrss.exe 
400 304 x86 0 wininit.exe 
408 392 x86 1 csrss.exe 
440 392 x86 1 winlogon.exe 
504 400 x86 0 services.exe 
512 400 x86 0 lsass.exe 
520 400 x86 0 lsm.exe 
628 504 x86 0 svchost.exe 
696 504 x86 0 svchost.exe 
744 504 x86 0 svchost.exe 
864 504 x86 0 svchost.exe 
932 504 x86 0 svchost.exe 
972 504 x86 0 svchost.exe 
1140 504 x86 0 svchost.exe 
1344 504 x86 0 spoolsv.exe 
1380 504 x86 1 taskhost.exe 
1408 504 x86 0 svchost.exe 
1512 972 x86 1 taskeng.exe 
1548 504 x86 0 mfemms.exe 
1636 1548 x86 0 mfevtps.exe 
1696 1512 x86 1 cmd.exe 
1708 1548 x86 0 mfehcs.exe 
1940 504 x86 0 sppsvc.exe 
2016 504 x86 0 svchost.exe 
340 408 x86 1 conhost.exe 
256 1696 x86 1 cmd.exe 
308 256 x86 1 GoatCasper.exe 
1780 864 x86 1 dwm.exe 
1008 1748 x86 1 explorer.exe 
1436 1008 x86 1 jusched.exe 
264 504 x86 0 svchost.exe 
648 504 x86 0 svchost.exe 
220 504 x86 0 SearchIndexer. 
2328 1008 x86 1 ¡REDACTED¿ 
2700 628 x86 1 Setup.exe 
2240 504 x86 0 msiexec.exe 
3272 2240 x86 1 msiexec.exe 
 3056  768  x86  0  MpCmdRun.exe  
Table  6. Unsafe Process List 
